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FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN SCHOOL AND PRISON 
Aaron H. Caplan∗ 
Abstract: Students often compare their schools unfavorably to prisons, most often in a 
tone of rueful irony. By contrast, judicial opinions about freedom of speech within 
government-run institutions compare schools and prisons without irony or even hesitation. 
This Article considers whether the analogy between school and prison in free speech cases is 
evidence that the two institutions share a joint mission. At a macro level, there is an 
undeniable structural similarity between the constitutional speech rules for schools and 
prisons. At a micro level, however, there are subtle but significant differences between the 
two. These arise primarily from the judiciary’s belief that differences exist between the 
purposes of schools and prisons—although, somewhat ominously, the differences appear 
even more subtle when comparing schools to jails. Just as judicial beliefs about social reality 
affect constitutional outcomes, the constitutional rules in turn affect social reality. Courts 
should be wary of language that equates schools with penal institutions, lest the analogy 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is the rare public school student who has not at least once 
complained that her school is like a prison, with the principal as warden 
and the teachers as guards. The trope of school-as-prison appears 
regularly in popular culture, most often voiced in a tone of rueful irony. 
For example, in an obituary for actor Patrick McGoohan, a critic wrote 
that McGoohan’s 1968 production The Prisoner was “the most 
important television series of my life” because “I was just then working 
out that my own junior high school was a kind of jail.”1 Andy Singer’s 
cartoon succeeds as satire because most people believe that school is not 
supposed to be like prison. Figure 1. School is supposed to be a site of 
uplift and optimism, providing students with the mental and social tools 
to thrive as free citizens. Prison, by contrast, is the antithesis of freedom, 
a place to quarantine a deviant population for whom our best efforts at 
education, uplift, and optimism have failed. With these expectations, 
identifying similarities between the two institutions amounts to an 
implicit call for change. 
By contrast, judicial opinions about freedom of speech compare 
schools and prisons without irony, and indeed without hesitation. Courts 
litter their decisions about prisoner speech with citations to decisions 
about student speech and vice versa. Many judges treat the analogy as if 
it were innately persuasive, requiring no special justification or 
explanation. 
Michel Foucault would say the judges are onto something. In 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault traced the historical progression from 
medieval forms of punishment that exacted retribution on the body of 
the accused (think torture or public execution) to the modern practice of 
incarceration.2 The shift was not, Foucault argued, evidence of evolving 
standards of decency. Rather, a well-developed prison system could 
simply be a more effective deterrent to wrongdoing by inculcating in 
prisoners the mental habits of discipline and subservience. Internalizing 
discipline in young minds is also, he believed, the essential function of 
the public school. Hence, it is no accident that the prison resembles the 
school, even down to its architecture: “Is it surprising,” Foucault asked,  
 
 
                                                     
1. Robert Lloyd, McGoohan Really Had Our Number: The ‘Prisoner’ Actor’s Indelible, 
Implacable Number 6 Lives On, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at E1. 
2. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan 
trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1977). 
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“that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all 
resemble prisons?”3 
This Article explores the analogy between school and prison in 
constitutional free speech cases. Is the analogy best understood as a 
mordant punch line or as evidence that the two institutions share a joint 
mission? In answering this question, I draw on a body of recent First 
Amendment scholarship debating the degree to which speech rules 
should operate differently within government-run institutions than they 
do in society at large.4 The literature often addresses the trio of schools, 
prisons, and military bases together as prototypical institutions where 
speakers enjoy less constitutional protection.5 The government 
workplace6 and the courtroom7 are also sometimes included. The 
similarities in judicial treatment across these institutions cause Professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky to lament that constitutional protections “apply least 
where they are needed the most.”8 Professor Frederick Schauer, by 
contrast, believes courts should go further in “incorporating institutional 
realities and demarcations into the First Amendment.”9 
A careful side-by-side comparison of speech doctrines for schools and 
prisons reveals some truth in both positions. Part I compares speech 
rules for schools and prisons at a macro level, concluding that 
commentators are correct to note a substantial structural similarity. 
Part II then turns to a micro-level comparison not undertaken in previous 
scholarly literature. This reveals that student speech seems to enjoy 
                                                     
3. Id. at 228. 
4. E.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821 (2008); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441 (1999); 
Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061 (2008); Frederick Schauer, 
Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2007). 
5. E.g., Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the Demise 
of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1473, 1548 (1994); Kevin Francis O’Neill, A First Amendment 
Compass: Navigating The Speech Clause With A Five-Step Analytical Framework, 9 SW. U. L. REV. 
223, 291–96 (2000); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1027, 1088 (2008); Robert Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and 
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1770 (1987); David M. Rabban, A Functional 
Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 248–49 (1990). 
6. E.g., Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh My! A Cautionary Note About 
Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1642, 
1649–52 (2007). 
7. E.g., Jona Goldschmidt, “Order In The Court!”: Constitutional Issues in the Law of 
Courtroom Decorum, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 39 (2008). 
8. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 441. 
9. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1279 
(2005). 
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marginally more constitutional protection than prisoner speech, albeit in 
subtle ways. 
With this description of the relevant legal doctrines in hand, Part III 
asks what about these institutions—or more specifically, what about 
judges’ perceptions of these institutions—contributes to the similar-yet-
different constitutional outcomes. Tellingly, the constitutional rules for 
speech in school have changed over time, in parallel with the Supreme 
Court’s stated views about the purpose of public education. At times, the 
Court has seemingly accepted the Foucaultian thesis10 that the goal of a 
public school is to create uniformly docile citizens; this belief leads to 
constitutional decisions acquiescing in suppression of student speech. At 
other times, the Court insists that schools exist to foster critical thinking 
and individuality, resulting in greater judicial protection for potentially 
disruptive student speech. A similar dynamic is harder to detect in prison 
speech cases, most likely because there is no comparable variation in 
judicial beliefs about the purposes of a prison. However, courts do 
recognize subtle differences between the institutions of prisons and jails, 
which raises an unsettling question: does the law treat speech in school 
the way it treats speech in jail? 
This Article concludes with a reminder that institutional sensitivity in 
judicial opinions operates in two directions. Just as judicial beliefs about 
social realities affect constitutional outcomes, the resulting constitutional 
rules affect social reality. For this reason, courts should be wary of 
invoking language that equates schools with penal institutions, lest the 
analogy become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
I. MACRO-LEVEL SIMILARITIES 
Schools and prisons share many surface similarities. Both house 
populations that are relatively homogenous compared to the population 
at large. Both have clear hierarchies within their staffs, and between the 
staff and a subservient general population. Both populations have 
cultures against snitching. Both have cafeterias, recreation areas, and on-
site infirmaries. Both limit access by outsiders. But do these similarities 
                                                     
10. I use Foucault as a shorthand for the idea that a school’s function is to create a socially 
compliant populace, but he is not the only social critic to make the observation. Decades earlier, 
H.L. Mencken said the aim of public education “is simply to reduce as many individuals as possible 
to the same safe level, to breed and train a standardized citizenry, to put down dissent and 
originality.” Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be “Free Speech” in Public Schools?, 12 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 56 n.73 (2008). Pink Floyd framed the issue in the couplet “We don’t 
need no education / We don’t need no thought control.” Or, in the words of an aphorism I once saw 
pinned to an office worker’s cubicle: “If you liked school, you’ll love work.” 
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of structure reflect a similarity of purpose? Those who presume—or at 
least hope—that the institutions serve different functions may be 
disconcerted at the ease with which court opinions analogize between 
speech in school and speech in prison. 
The analogy sometimes reveals itself through the half-conscious 
process of selecting legal authorities for citation. When ruling on the 
speech rights of prisoners, judges frequently cite to cases about the 
speech rights of students. In Procunier v. Martinez11 and Pell v. 
Procunier12—two early prison speech cases decided within one month of 
each other in 1974—Supreme Court opinions cited the leading case on 
student speech in high school, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District,13 for the proposition that the First 
Amendment should be applied “in light of the special characteristics of 
the . . . environment” in which it is invoked.14 There was no particular 
need for the Justices to cite school speech law for this proposition. They 
could just as easily have cited one of the oldest free speech chestnuts 
available, namely Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s influential 
hypothetical of “falsely shouting fire in a theater” as an illustration of the 
principle that “the character of every act depends upon the circumstances 
in which it is done.”15 For good or ill, the urge to cite school speech 
decisions in prisoner speech cases continues to the present day. For 
example, the Seventh Circuit recently upheld a prison rule against 
drawing “gang symbols,” relying in part on cases approving similar rules 
for public schools.16 
The analogy is also used in the opposite direction, with student speech 
cases citing prisoner speech cases as precedent. The Ninth Circuit 
recently held that a vice principal’s allegedly threatening words to a 
student were not actionable, in part because similar words said by a 
guard to a prisoner were found not actionable.17 In deciding whether a 
Native American elementary student had a First Amendment right to 
wear long hair to school, a Texas court stated that “prison cases, while 
not controlling in the context of public schools, are instructive on the 
                                                     
11. 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
12. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
13. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
14. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 409–10 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506); Pell, 417 U.S. at 837 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
15. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
16. Koutnik v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777, 783–84 (7th Cir. 2006). 
17. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 564–65 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 
925 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
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issue.”18 
Indeed, students and prisoners sometimes make joint appearances in 
cases having nothing to do with the rights of either group. For example, 
in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.,19 a case about zoning 
ordinances for theaters showing sexually explicit films, the Supreme 
Court combined Tinker (school) and Procunier (prison) in a string cite 
as support for the proposition that “the government can tailor its reaction 
to different types of speech according to the degree to which its special 
and overriding interests are implicated.”20 Most recently, in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, 21 the Supreme Court embarked 
on a mighty string cite identifying “a narrow class of speech restrictions 
that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons . . . based on an 
interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.” 22 
The list included (in order) schools, prisons, the military, and the 
government workplace.23 Lower courts have duly followed the Supreme 
Court’s lead. A Ninth Circuit case considering deportation procedures 
listed “schools” and “prisons” at the top of its list of “institutional 
settings with special needs,” although the case involved neither.24 A 
Seventh Circuit decision involving teachers’ access to school buildings 
compared public school students to “other involuntary guests of the 
government, such as prison inmates.”25 
On rare occasions, judges reveal discomfort over the analogy. In 
another case about teacher access to buildings, the First Circuit 
explained that “neither teachers, students, nor anyone else has an 
absolute constitutional right to use all parts of a school building for 
unlimited expressive purposes,” citing to cases about schools and prisons 
(and military bases).26 Somewhat sheepishly, the court included a 
                                                     
18. Alab. & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trs. of Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 
1323–24, 1332 (E.D. Tex. 1993). 
19. 475 U.S. 41 (1986), rev’g 748 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984) (Fletcher, J.). 
20. Id. at 49–50. 
21. 558 U.S. __, No. 08-205, 2010 WL 183856 (Jan. 21, 2010). 
22. Id. at *19.  
23. Id. 
24. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1052–53, 1066 (9th Cir. 
1995) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (school); Turner v. Safley, 
482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison)). 
25. May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1112 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) 
(citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prison); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (school)). 
26. Conn. State Fed’n of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 538 F.2d 471, 480 (1st Cir. 1976) (citing 
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military base); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 
(1972) (school); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (prison)). 
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footnote that stated: “In citing [prison cases], we are aware that ‘a school 
is not like a hospital or a jail enclosure.’”27 The court did not explain 
why, despite its awareness of this difference, it pursued the analogy 
anyway. 
Beyond these citation choices, the analogy between school speech and 
prison speech finds expression in the governing legal standards. In its 
most famous passage, Tinker proclaimed that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”28 The leading case on prisoner speech rights, Turner 
v. Safley,29 said that “prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison 
inmates from the protections of the Constitution,”30 echoing an earlier 
statement that “there is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution 
and the prisons of this country.”31 Having leaped these physical barriers 
in a single bound, however, the Constitution is drained by the effort. The 
Court tells us that “the constitutional rights of students in public school 
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings,”32 and also that “a prison inmate retains [only] those First 
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner 
or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections 
system.”33 Speech in these settings is subject to greater governmental 
restriction, but the government’s control is not absolute: administrators 
of both schools and prisons may not suppress speech merely out of 
disagreement with the speaker. Prison regulations must not constitute an 
“exaggerated response” to inmate speech,34 and school discipline may 
not be based upon “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance”35 or “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”36 
Lower courts have duly noted the parallels. “[T]he Supreme Court has 
recognized that the special demands placed on public school 
administrators, like the demands placed on prison administrators, 
                                                     
27. Id. at 480 n.5 (1st Cir. 1976) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 n.6). 
28. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
29. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
30. Id. at 84. 
31. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974). 
32. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986). 
33. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1979). 
34. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. 
35. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
36. Id. at 509. 
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necessitate special leeway.”37 As a D.C. Circuit opinion dealing with 
prison speech explained: 
Cases analyzing constitutional claims by those within 
governmental institutions such as prisons [and] public 
schools . . . often open with the axiom that the boundaries of 
those institutions do not separate inhabitants from their 
constitutional rights. This observation is invariably followed by 
the complementary principle that by their nature such 
environments must allow regulation more intrusive than what 
may lawfully apply to the general public. In these environments, 
the government is permitted to balance constitutional rights 
against institutional efficiency in ways it may not ordinarily 
do.38 
The similarity of structure can express itself in the very words chosen 
to describe the legal standards. Where Turner asks whether prison 
speech regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests,”39 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier40 asks whether a 
principal’s decision to remove content from a school newspaper is 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”41 Many 
commentators have commented on this mirror-image language in Turner 
and Hazelwood,42 some calling it “striking” 43 or “virtually fungible.”44 
                                                     
37. Torres v. Wis. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1534 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting). See also Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 964 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(Holloway, J., concurring in part) (implying resemblance between the Turner and Tinker standards). 
38. Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 
541, 547–48 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting the same pattern). 
39. 482 U.S. at 89. 
40. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
41. Id. at 273. 
42. Clay Calvert, Bylines Behind Bars: Fame, Frustration & First Amendment Freedom, 28 LOY. 
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 71, 96–99 (2008); Kenneth Lasson, Controversial Speakers on Campus: 
Liberties, Limitations, and Common-Sense Guidelines, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 39, 67 & n.135 
(1999); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1368 n.102 
(2000); Adam Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1291, 1314 
& n.112 (2004). Looking at prison speech and school speech cases as a group, one writer claims that 
when the Turner and Hazelwood lines of cases are considered together, they “stand for the broad 
proposition that prisoners and public school students have few free speech rights worth protecting.” 
Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1123, 
1143 n.134 (1997). 
43. Lance D. Cassak, Hearing The Cries Of Prisoners: The Third Circuit’s Treatment Of 
Prisoners’ Rights Litigation, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 526, 581 n.290 (1989) (“The equation of 
prisoners and students for constitutional purposes probably provides little comfort to either group.”). 
44. Calvert, supra note 42, at 98. 
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II. MICRO-LEVEL DIFFERENCES  
The macro-level similarities are certainly a big story, but they are not 
the whole story. Beyond their structural resemblance, the speech rules 
for schools and prisons have some noteworthy differences in detail and 
emphasis. The dissimilarities reveal themselves in the formal legal 
doctrine, the application of that doctrine, and—perhaps most 
strikingly— in judicial discussions of the deference that is due to school 
and prison administrators. In subtle ways, current law conforms to the 
common expectation that school should be a more free place than prison. 
The difference between the two bodies of law is not as great as it could 
be, but a rank ordering does exist, within which prisons are allowed 
greater ability to restrict speech than schools. 
A. Differences in Doctrine 
We should begin by debunking the “striking” parallel between prison 
speech restrictions that are “reasonably related to legitimate penological 
interests” under Turner45 and school speech restrictions that are 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” under 
Hazelwood.46 These similarly worded standards apply to different ranges 
of speech within the institutions. With a few narrow exceptions,47 the 
Turner standard applies “to all circumstances in which the needs of 
prison administration implicate constitutional rights.”48 Thus it reaches 
all instances of speech by prisoners, as well as to prisoner attempts to 
exercise other rights, such as privacy or association.49 The Hazelwood 
                                                     
45. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). To decide whether a regulation satisfies this test, 
courts consider the connection between the regulation and the prison’s actual needs; the ability of 
the prisoner to exercise the restricted right in other ways; the adverse impact of any accommodation 
on others within the prison; and the existence of any ready alternative that might suggest that the 
restriction was an “exaggerated response.” Id. at 89–90. 
46. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
47. Thus far, two exceptions have been recognized to the general statement that Turner controls 
every case involving constitutional rights of prisoners. First, Turner does not ratchet down the 
protections of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, since it applies 
uniquely to prisoners to begin with. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Second, Turner does not relax the equal protection prohibition against disparate treatment on the 
basis of race. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509–12 (2005). 
48. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990). 
49. See, e.g., Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (right to procreate). The Turner 
standard was applied to free exercise of religion in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987). A more rights-protective standard now applies to prisoners’ free exercise claims under the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 
(2006). See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
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standard, by contrast, applies only to “school-sponsored publications, 
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, 
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear 
the imprimatur of the school.”50 Students’ self-sponsored speech enjoys 
much greater protection.51 Finally, within its sphere of influence, the 
Hazelwood “pedagogical concerns” standard actually represents a limit 
on school administrators’ power over government-sponsored speech. 
Other government agencies enjoy near-plenary power to determine the 
content of their sponsored speech.52 
The better comparison is between the two baseline rules expressed in 
Turner for prisoners and in Tinker for students. Unlike Turner, Tinker 
requires more than a merely legitimate reason to restrict student speech. 
The trial court in Tinker stated that school administrators have the power 
and also the “obligation to prevent anything which might be disruptive” 
of the educational process.53 The Supreme Court rejected this notion, 
holding instead that schools may only restrict student speech that 
“materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”54 Comparing these 
two baseline rules suggests that speech in school should enjoy more 
protection than speech in prison—the school must prove that the speech 
will cause a significant problem before any restriction is attempted. 
Since Tinker was decided in 1969, the Supreme Court has announced 
a number of exceptions to its general rule. Schools need not show 
substantial disruption, the Supreme Court has said, to censor school-
sponsored newspapers,55 or to punish students for on-campus remarks 
that are sexually suggestive or vulgar56 or that could reasonably be 
perceived as advocating illegal drug use.57 A debate has long waged as 
to whether these cases represent exceptions to Tinker or repudiations of 
                                                     
50. 484 U.S. at 271. 
51. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 933 (10th Cir. 2002) (contrasting 
student speech with school-sponsored speech). 
52. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
193–94 (1991). 
53. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 1966). 
54. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (quoting Burnside v. 
Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)). For a more thorough discussion of the Tinker standard, see Aaron 
H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet Forums, 39 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 120–31 (2003). 
55. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73. 
56. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986). 
57. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
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it.58 This debate seems likely to continue in light of the Supreme Court’s 
recent statement in Morse v. Frederick59 (the “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” 
case) that “the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute.”60 If 
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Morse is to be believed, there are no new 
exceptions waiting in the wings.61 If Justice Thomas’s concurrence is to 
be believed, ad hoc exceptions will proliferate because “our 
jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools 
except when they don’t.”62 Whatever changes may be in the offing for 
student speech protections, for present purposes the point remains that 
students enjoy a more-protective baseline rule subject to less-protective 
exceptions, while prisoner speech has a less-protective baseline rule that 
to date has not been subjected to any more-protective exceptions. 
This comparison of baseline rules suggests that a speech restriction 
that would be excessive for prisoners would, by definition, be excessive 
for students. This reasoning was employed in Big Sandy,63 where a 
district court relied on prison cases to require a Native American 
religious exception to a school’s ban on long hair for male students.64 
“[S]everal courts have found viable alternatives to hair length 
restrictions in prison cases . . . . Surely, school officials can likewise 
implement alternatives which pass constitutional muster.”65 
At the very least, a court choosing to uphold treatment of a student 
that would not be allowed for a prisoner will have some explaining to 
do. The need for such an explanation occurred in Ingraham v. Wright,66 
where a majority of the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
cruel and unusual punishment clause did not apply to corporal 
                                                     
58. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the 
Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000); Jennifer A. Giuttari, 
Morse v. Frederick: Locking The “Schoolhouse Gate” On The First Amendment, 69 MONT. L. REV. 
447, 460 (2008); Mark Yudof, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 365, 367–68 (1995). 
59. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
60. Id. at 396, 405. This passage may be the most far-reaching aspect of the Morse opinion. 
Aaron H. Caplan, Visions of Public Education In Morse v. Frederick, 3 J. OF EDUC. CONTROVERSY 
1 (2008), http://www.wce.wwu.edu/Resources/CEP/eJournal/v003n001/a013.shtml, also available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1201869. 
61. Morse, 551 U.S. at 425 (Alito, J., concurring). 
62. Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
63. Ala. & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trs. of Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319 
(E.D. Tex. 1993). 
64. Id. at 1332. 
65. Id. at 1333 (citation omitted). 
66. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
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punishment in a public school.67 A vigorous dissent decried the result, 
saying that punishments that are too barbaric for convicted criminals 
must by definition be too barbaric for school children.68 The majority 
felt obliged to respond to the charge, evidently fearing that its textual 
and historical review of the Eighth Amendment was not enough.69 The 
seemingly anomalous result decried by the dissent was acceptable, said 
the majority, because “[t]he schoolchild has little need for the protection 
of the Eighth Amendment.”70 The majority reasoned that students are not 
likely to be beaten as badly as prisoners are, and because students leave 
school at the end of the day and are usually surrounded by witnesses, 
severe school beatings will be quickly discovered and redressed through 
tort suits.71 Whatever one thinks of this logic, it is notable that the 
Ingraham majority did not argue that it actually would be acceptable to 
treat students worse than prisoners. 
B. Differences in Application 
To know what the words of a legal doctrine really mean, one must see 
it applied in practice. In the right hands, even a standard designed to be 
lenient (like “legitimate penological purpose”) may impose a significant 
limit on governmental action.72 Therefore, we should consider how the 
Turner and Tinker standards have been applied on analogous facts. 
1. Prior Restraint 
Prisons routinely screen incoming mail—both letters from individuals 
and publications, such as magazines and books—and refuse to deliver 
mail that is deemed inimical to the institution. The dangers may come in 
the form of physical contraband, such as drugs, cash, or weapons hidden 
in the package.73 Or the danger may come from the information itself, 
such as plans for escape or other information detrimental to prison 
                                                     
67. Id. at 664. 
68. Id. at 684 (White, J., dissenting). 
69. Id. at 668–70 (majority opinion). 
70. Id. at 670. 
71. Id. 
72. For example, Judge Fletcher once argued in an Eighth Amendment case that “a bare desire to 
exact blood vengeance from the perpetrator of a crime, harbored and nursed along over the course 
of years and decades” is not a “legitimate penological goal.” Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1375 
(9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
73. E.g., Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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security.74 As a result, screening of prisoner mail for content is routinely 
upheld in the interests of prison security.75 
The same security concerns are not present in a school setting. 
Students are therefore free to bring whatever communicative materials 
they wish to school without prior restraint, subject only to subsequent 
punishment if the material causes substantial on-campus disruption.76 A 
mostly unbroken string of court decisions from the heyday of the 
underground newspaper movement uphold students’ rights not only to 
publish outside of school, but also to bring their writings on campus with 
the presumption of legitimacy.77 
2. Vulgarity 
Most lower court opinions have interpreted Bethel School District v. 
Fraser78 to mean that a school’s “interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior”79 justifies punishment for 
vulgarity or sexual innuendo delivered in inappropriate school settings, 
such as a salacious nomination speech delivered during a school 
assembly.80 One might expect that a prison, segregated by sex and filled 
with adult convicted felons, would tolerate a much higher level of 
vulgarity and sexual content. Indeed, it is likely that prison 
administrators let most instances of vulgar prisoner speech slide without 
taking disciplinary action. But when prison rules against vulgarity exist 
and are challenged, they are often upheld. For example, a prisoner who 
complained that he was tired of “chickenshit rules” could be disciplined 
for “vulgar or insolent language” in order to teach inmates to comport 
themselves in a decent, mature, and civil manner.81 More often, 
however, curbs on prisoners’ vulgar speech are justified not for 
educational or rehabilitative purposes, but because of the risk that such 
speech could erode discipline or lead to violence (even if the speech 
                                                     
74. E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974). 
75. E.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404, 415 (1989). 
76. Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1988). But see Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 
822 F.2d 747, 755 (8th Cir. 1987). 
77. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049–50 (2d Cir. 1979); Shanley v. Ne. 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 967–68 (5th Cir. 1972); Scoville v. Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 15 
(7th Cir. 1970). 
78. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
79. Id. at 681. 
80. See Caplan, supra note 54, at 131–34; see also Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 
524, 531–33 (9th Cir. 1992) (Goodwin, J., concurring). 
81. Durkin v. Taylor, 444 F. Supp. 879, 880, 883 (E.D. Va. 1977). 
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does not meet the constitutional definitions of incitement or fighting 
words). Thus, male inmates who direct vulgar or sexually explicit 
comments toward female prison staff may be punished,82 and prison 
rules against vulgar language generally have been upheld on their face.83 
But the precedents are not unanimous on this point. Some courts 
refuse to accept a prison’s assertions that prisoner vulgarity poses a 
genuine security problem. In McNamara v. Moody,84 a prisoner wrote a 
letter to his girlfriend speculating that the mailroom staff reading his 
outgoing mail were masturbating and having sex with cats.85 The Fifth 
Circuit held that no genuine threat to prison security was at stake, only 
disapproval of the prisoner’s speech.86 The Eighth Circuit used similar 
reasoning to overturn discipline of a prisoner who wrote a letter to his 
brother complaining that the mailroom screener was “a beetle-eyed bit—
 . . . who enjoys reading people’s mail,” and who hoped “to read a 
letter . . . talking dirty sh—, so she could go in the bathroom and 
masturbate.”87 Because the intemperate language did not implicate 
“security concerns,”88 discipline for such a letter violated the First 
Amendment.89 These cases may well be anomalies best explained by the 
fact that the vulgarities were contained in letters directed outside the 
prison, and not hurled orally in the face of prison staff in conditions that 
might result in loss of face. 
3. Defiance of Authority 
The vulgar speech most likely to lead to prison discipline is speech 
directed at those in authority. The prison vulgarity cases described above 
probably have more to do with protecting prison staff from challenges to 
their authority than with protecting them from naughty words. Indeed, 
one would read the advance sheets in vain to search for a case in which a 
prisoner is punished for vulgar speech directed at another prisoner. 
                                                     
82. See, e.g., Jackson v. Onondaga County, 549 F. Supp. 2d 204, 208 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (prisoner 
calls guard “ugly” and uses profanity); Kirsch v. Franklin, 897 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (E.D. Wis. 
1995) (prisoner propositions female staff); Mujahid v. Apao, 795 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (D. Haw. 
1992) (prisoner makes sexually explicit comments to staff nurse). 
83. See, e.g., Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040, 1045 (5th Cir. 1986); Ustrak v. Fairman, 781 F.2d 
573, 580 (7th Cir. 1986). 
84. 606 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1979). 
85. Id. at 623. 
86. Id. at 624. 
87. Loggins v. Delo, 999 F.2d 364, 365 (8th Cir. 1993) (redactions in original). 
88. Id. at 367. 
89. Id. 
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Schools, by comparison, are more likely to discipline students for insults 
against other students. (In recent years, more attention has properly been 
paid to the role of school staff in eradicating a culture of school bullying. 
School discipline for this purpose is generally considered proper, as 
reflected in the fact that so few students bother to go to court to 
challenge that sort of discipline.) 
For a school or a prison to punish speech in defiance of authority is a 
clear deviation from ordinary free speech principles that give special 
protection to speech criticizing governmental authority.90 In addition, 
speech aimed directly at government officials implicates the First 
Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances. The more clear it 
is that a student (or a prisoner) is expressing a substantive point whose 
political content can be readily perceived, the more likely it is that a 
court will overlook any vulgarity or insolence it contains. Thus, students 
who wore black armbands to protest a new school dress code stated a 
claim,91 as did students who attempted to organize a boycott of a 
school’s annual chocolate sale for the same purpose.92 Students are 
allowed to wear t-shirts criticizing a school’s disciplinary decisions93 and 
to wear buttons supporting a striking teacher’s union that read, “I’m not 
listening, scab.”94 Courts have also upheld students’ rights to gather 
signatures on actual petitions.95 But if the student’s language veers into 
threatening language not clearly aimed at airing grievances, discipline 
may still result.96 
On occasion, courts will also strike down prison discipline that has 
potential to chill the expression of legitimate grievances. When a prison 
issued an infraction against a prisoner for complaining to a guard about 
the guard’s refusal to accommodate the prisoner’s disability, the prisoner 
                                                     
90. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 453, 466–67 (1987) (First Amendment protects right to 
verbally challenge police); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (First Amendment 
protects political hyperbole that contains violent imagery about shooting the President); N.Y. Times 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (First Amendment protects some false statements made about 
public officers). 
91. Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 508 F. Supp. 2d 713, 722 (E.D. Ark. 2007). 
92. Hatter v. L.A. City High Sch. Dist., 452 F.2d 673, 674 (9th Cir. 1971). 
93. Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A 05-1076, 2005 WL 2106562, at *2–3 (W.D. 
Pa. Aug. 24, 2005). 
94. Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 526, 530 (9th Cir. 1992). 
95. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 764 (9th Cir. 2006). But see Walker-Serrano v. 
Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 418 (3rd Cir. 2003) (no right for elementary school students to circulate 
petition). 
96. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1996); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area 
Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 869 (Pa. 2002). 
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was found to state a triable free speech claim.97 In another case, a prison 
rule against using “hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening” language in 
prison was upheld on its face, but was found to violate the First 
Amendment as applied to an inmate grievance complaining that a guard 
“shows her misuse of her authority and her psychological disorder needs 
attention.”98 The prison vulgarity rule could not be used to punish 
criticism of government agents. “Prisoners should be allowed to file 
grievances within the prison system without fear of being sanctioned for 
an unhappy choice of words, except to the extent that [the words 
include] criminal threats.”99 More typical, however, are cases upholding 
discipline against insolent prisoner speech.100 
4. Decisions with No Control Group 
The speech that tends to be restricted in school is not necessarily the 
same speech that tends to be restricted in prison. Many of the prison 
speech cases, for example, deal with restrictions on mail delivery 
between prisoners and outsiders.101 No school speech cases address this 
question, since students do not receive their mail at school. Cases that 
refuse to recognize a right of the press to enter prison grounds to 
interview prisoners102 have no counterpart at school, since journalists 
may interview students at home. In the other direction, prisons tend not 
to sponsor newspapers staffed by prisoners, so there is no prison 
counterpart to Hazelwood.103 And because most prisons do not allow 
internet access, there have yet to be reported decisions involving 
discipline for prisoners’ online speech, in contrast to the growing docket 
of student internet speech cases.104 
Even when imposing discipline for a similar reason (such as vulgarity 
or insolence), school and prison administrators may have different 
thresholds for action. For example, the preceding section found a higher 
rate of cases upholding the right to challenge institutional officials in a 
                                                     
97. Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 2002) (Fletcher, J.). 
98. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1995). 
99. Id. at 1279 (quoting Bradley v. Hall, 911 F. Supp. 446, 450 (D. Or. 1994)). 
100. E.g., In re Parmelee, 115 Wash. App. 273, 287, 63 P.3d 800, 807 (Ct. App. 2003). 
101. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 
102. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 
(1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
103. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In the absence of internal 
outlets, some prisoners contribute material to outside publications. See also Calvert, supra note 42. 
104. See Caplan, supra note 54; Papandrea, supra note 5. 
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school setting than in a prison setting. This might be seen as evidence 
that courts are more interested in protecting students’ rights to this type 
of speech. However, it could also mean that the same legal protection 
applies, but that school administrators with a lower tolerance for 
disobedience are more likely to violate it. 
We are left to conduct thought experiments to try to determine how 
courts would resolve directly comparable cases in areas where they have 
not arisen on their own. For example, there do not appear to be any cases 
involving prisoners disciplined under a Morse-type rule barring speech 
that could be interpreted as advocating illegal drug use.105 This is most 
likely because prison administrators have bigger fish to fry. But I predict 
most courts would uphold such discipline if a warden were to argue that 
legitimate penological interests existed, such as the state’s interests in 
lowering in-prison demand for contraband and in reforming drug 
abusers. Similarly, a hypothetical prison-sponsored newspaper would 
likely be subject to at least as much editorial censorship as a school-
sponsored newspaper. 
C. Differences in Judicial Deference 
The most visible difference between school and prison speech cases 
may be found in their discussions of judicial deference. Although the 
comparison is by necessity impressionistic, courts seem to place far 
more emphasis on deference to institutional authority in cases involving 
prisons and comparatively less in cases involving schools.106 
1. Scope of Deference 
When explaining why prisoners’ rights receive less protection than 
                                                     
105. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
106. One author’s impressionistic sense is that the deference courts show to prison and school 
administrators are roughly congruent. Scott Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When 
Minimalism and Judicial Modesty Go Too Far, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549, 554–59 (2009). For its 
part, Congress seems to believe judicial deference is more important in prisoner rights cases. The 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was aimed specifically at the perceived problem of 
insufficient judicial deference to prison administrators, and imposes both procedural and substantive 
requirements that make it harder for a court to rule in a prison conditions case. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
110 Stat. 1321-71 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)–(g) (2006)). No similar statute limits the ability 
of courts to hear constitutional complaints of students. Indeed, several statutes expressly authorize 
judicial review of educational decisions. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400 (2006); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); Equal 
Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2006); see generally Aaron H. Caplan, Stretching the Equal Access 
Act Beyond Equal Access, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 273, 300–01 (2004) (discussing the congressional 
choice to create a cause of action within the Equal Access Act). 
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those of non-incarcerated persons, courts very frequently turn to theories 
of judicial deference. The Supreme Court has stated that “prison 
administrators . . . and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult 
judgments concerning institutional operations.”107 Prison management 
decisions “are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise 
of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the 
record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to 
these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert 
judgment in such matters.”108 
By contrast, overt statements about deference to school administrators 
are harder to find. Perhaps the most extended effort to instill an ethic of 
deference came in Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Minersville School 
District v. Gobitis,109 which asserted that “the courtroom is not the arena 
for debating issues of educational policy.”110 This view was rejected by a 
majority of the Court when Gobitis was overturned by West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette111 only three years later: 
The [Constitution] protects the citizen against the State itself and 
all of its creatures—Boards of Education not excepted. These 
have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits 
of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous [judicial] protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to 
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount 
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.112 
Justice Frankfurter’s cries for deference to school administrators were 
relegated to a fretful dissent in Barnette,113 and no subsequent Supreme 
Court decision about student speech rights has restated it at similar 
length or intensity. 
The closest the Supreme Court has come to a renewed discussion of 
deference to school administrators is Wood v. Strickland,114 which held 
                                                     
107. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977). 
108. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974). For other statements about the importance of 
deference to prison officials, see Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006); Overton v. Bazzetta, 
539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974). 
109. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
110. Id. at 598. 
111. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
112. Id. at 637. 
113. See id. at 656–58 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
114. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
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that federal courts should not be in the business of correcting school 
districts’ errors of interpretation of their own disciplinary regulations.115 
At the same time, the majority made clear that no similar deference 
would be forthcoming where a student’s allegations “rise to the level of 
violations of specific constitutional guarantees.”116 A partial dissent 
complained that the Court “appears to impose a higher standard of care 
upon public school officials, sued under § 1983, than that heretofore 
required of any other official.”117 
Language about deference in modern school speech opinions usually 
takes the form of a quick aside, while the main focus is elsewhere. For 
example, Bethel mentions that punishment of student speech “properly 
rests with the school board,”118 but the overall tenor of the opinion is a 
condemnation of Fraser’s off-color nomination speech and praise for the 
decision to punish it. Similarly, Morse mentions that the principal had to 
make a split-second decision whether to punish the students who hoisted 
the BONG HITS 4 JESUS banner,119 but the discussion is more in the 
nature of a qualified immunity analysis than to suggest that the court was 
declining to decide whether the banner merited punishment. The primary 
impression left by most recent cases is not so much that the Court is 
deferring to school disciplinary decisions, but that it agrees with them.120 
2. Reasons for Deference 
School and prison opinions also express different views about why 
deference is appropriate. The prison cases assert arguments that are 
familiar from any setting where judges do not wish to overturn decisions 
of other governmental entities. Prisons are creatures of the legislative 
and executive branches, these opinions say, so deference should be 
                                                     
115. Id. at 326. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 327 (Powell, J., dissenting in part). 
118. 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). A similar pattern can be seen in Hazelwood, where the court’s 
opinion seems more interested in expressing agreement with the censorship decision than with 
elaborating on the “oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the 
responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.” 
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
119. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007). 
120. On the distinction between deference and agreement, see Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of 
Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072–78 (2008). Interestingly, there is no discussion of 
deference in the series of cases reviewing school officials’ decisions to allow or disallow access to 
school grounds for expressive purposes. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. Dist., 533 U.S. 
98 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Westside 
Cmty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
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afforded out of respect for separation of powers.121 Where state prisons 
are involved, federal courts should defer for reasons of federalism.122 Or 
when push comes to shove, managing prisons is simply not the court’s 
job.123 
But beyond these standard arguments for judicial deference, one 
justification is voiced more regularly and with greater pride of place than 
any of the others: running a prison is difficult. The task involves 
“Herculean obstacles” that “are too apparent to warrant explication.”124 
As a result, “the problems of prisons in America are complex and 
intractable.”125 The sheer difficulty of the task is commonly described as 
the primary reason for judicial deference: 
[T]he problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a 
corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison 
administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging 
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices 
that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and 
discipline and to maintain institutional security.126 
Deference is considered appropriate because “courts are ill equipped 
to deal with” the difficulty of prison management.127 The task is so hard, 
in fact, that “[j]udicial scrutiny of prisoner regulations is an endeavor 
fraught with peril.”128 By contrast, the difficulty of the school 
disciplinarian’s job is virtually never raised as a justification for 
deference even in those school speech opinions that mention deference 
as a virtue. 
Is it really true that running a prison is so much harder than running a 
school? Or that it is so much more foreign to the expertise of the judge? 
Of all executive functions, running the prison may be the one most 
closely connected to the judicial role, as the courtroom is a necessary 
gateway to incarceration. Even if running a prison were uniquely 
difficult, deciding cases and controversies in which the parties may be 
engaged in complex or difficult tasks is a standard part of a judge’s job. 
                                                     
121. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987). 
122. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995). 
123. Id. at 482 (decrying “the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of 
prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone”); Turner, 482 
U.S. at 84; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974). 
124. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 404. 
125. Id. at 404–05. 
126. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1974); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 84. 
127. Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977). 
128. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 536 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
Caplan DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:31 PM 
92 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:71 
 
To take but one example, a senior judge on the Ninth Circuit might, 
throughout her career, decide cases involving such difficult endeavors as 
wildlife management,129 human resources management,130 or computer 
cryptography.131 
I suspect that the palpably different volume and content of deference 
language in school and prison cases may flow from the needs of yet 
another institution: the judiciary itself. Prisoner cases are less appealing 
to adjudicate than student cases. Much of this stems from the vastly 
greater volume of prisoner litigation. Although prison speech cases were 
not tracked separately, 32.3% of all civil appeals to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 2008 involved prisoners.132 This far outstrips 
appeals brought by other private parties.133 At the trial court level, 
federal judicial districts that are home to large prison populations can 
expect even more: for the Eastern District of California, prisoner 
petitions amount to 41.6% of the district’s total case load.134 By contrast, 
student-rights litigation is such a small portion of the case load that the 
Ninth Circuit does not bother to track it separately. 
Consider the litigation obstacles and incentives for each group. 
Except in unusual circumstances, school discipline for speech tends to 
be short-term suspension from school. A student upset with a school’s 
disciplinary proceedings is ordinarily not able to obsess over the 
grievance too much, as the rest of life competes for the student’s 
attention. Students are unlikely to litigate without support from their 
families, and families have many reasons not to escalate into litigation: 
parents may agree with the discipline; job and family obligations 
compete for parents’ available time; and parents may worry that one 
child’s litigation might adversely affect relationships for other children 
still enrolled in the school system. Then there is the out-of-pocket cost: 
hiring a lawyer is a practical necessity for student rights litigation, as the 
                                                     
129. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fletcher, J.), rev’d, 
555 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008). 
130. Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1984) (Fletcher, 
J.), aff’d, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
131. Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (Fletcher, J.). Judge 
Fletcher so excelled in the art and science of cryptography that a writer said of her: “Judge Fletcher 
was a cypherpunk in robes!” STEPHEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE 
GOVERNMENT 302 (2001). 
132. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED STATES COURTS 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 41 
(2008) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/ 
AnnualReport2008.pdf. 
133. Id. at 42. 
134. Circuit Responds to Influx of Prisoner Petitions, in id. at 23. 
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students themselves do not have the maturity or the legal training to 
represent themselves. 
A prisoner with a grievance, on the other hand, has plenty of time to 
focus on the injury, as daily prison life offers far fewer attractive 
distractions. There is less need to obtain counsel, because the prisoner 
has ample time to work on briefs and there may be writ-writers in 
residence to provide pointers.135 The prison litigant need not enlist 
family members as allies, and there is no reason to worry that the 
litigation could damage otherwise valuable ongoing relationships with 
prison authorities. Although the Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes 
some procedural hurdles, in forma pauperis status is usually granted so 
filing fees are not a barrier. Overall, other than the time and effort 
involved, there is little downside to litigating. Indeed, the litigation can 
provide some much-needed direction and purpose for the prisoner. (I do 
not mean to suggest that cases brought by prisoners are inherently 
meritless, only to explain why prisoner litigation greatly outnumbers 
student litigation, even though students outnumber prisoners.) 
In light of these realities, many judges will understandably feel that 
adjudicating prisoner claims is less enjoyable than adjudicating student 
claims. The prisoner cases present a never-ending stream of low-priority 
decisions that take time away from more interesting fare. As a group, 
they blend together and lack a sense of drama. The briefs tend to be 
amateur at best, baffling at worst, and some of them may even be 
handwritten.136 Oral argument presents logistical headaches. By contrast, 
student cases are a novelty, a break from the typical case load. The 
parties are represented by counsel. All of those involved in deciding the 
case (including the court staff and judicial clerks) can relate to the facts, 
through memories of their own student years, or those of their children. 
The press may be interested in the dispute. Overall, school cases are 
much more fun to decide. All of this matters when it comes to judicial 
deference. Deferring to prison authorities is an attractive option when 
dealing with a large group of tedious cases whose volume one would 
like to reduce. Deferring to school authorities does little more than 
remove a tiny number of attractive cases from the docket. 
                                                     
135. Rules forbidding prisoners from helping each other with their legal documents are 
unconstitutional, Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969), but a prison need not create special 
exemptions to otherwise valid rules in order to facilitate such assistance, Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 
223, 231 (2001). 
136. According to the Ninth Circuit’s Annual Report: “Most prisoner petitions are filed pro se, or 
without benefit of counsel, and generally require more time and effort to process.” Circuit Responds 
to Influx of Prisoner Petitions, in ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 132, at 23. 
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Even if my musings about the willingness of courts to use deference 
doctrines as a method of docket control are wrong, there remains one 
other factor that may explain why school and prison cases are written 
differently. The main audience for prisoner speech opinions (in addition 
to the parties, counsel, and other judges) will be prisoners eager to use a 
favorable opinion as ammunition in support of potential future litigation. 
By contrast, the readers of student speech opinions include (in addition 
to the parties, judges, and lawyers) other students, educators, and—if the 
opinion draws press attention—the general public. These cases feel like 
teaching moments, a fact that may explain why so many school speech 
opinions devote considerable attention to describing the court’s vision of 
public education. The public, moreover, is accustomed to the notion that 
courts will rule on the merits of school-related disputes. Even without 
formal legal training, many citizens know that the Supreme Court 
ordered desegregation of the schools in Brown v. Board of Education137 
and that it forbade government-sponsored prayer in schools in the early 
1960s.138 The public expects a decision. For this audience, the deference 
message—“it’s not our job”—will be far less persuasive. 
III. HOW COURTS VIEW THE INSTITUTIONS 
Part I explained that courts afford less constitutional protection to 
speech within schools and prisons than to speech in society at large. 
Part II documented subtle but persistent differences in the speech rules 
for these two institutions. This Part asks what it is about those 
institutions—at least as judges perceive them—that might create those 
patterns. 
A. Schools 
Supreme Court decisions involving the speech rights of public school 
students seem to take affirmative delight in expounding upon the 
purpose of the public school. The flag salute cases of the early 1940s—
Gobitis and Barnette—nicely reveal how a court’s beliefs about an 
institution will affect the law it applies to that institution. 
The Court first considered the speech rights of public school students 
in a pair of cases in which Jehovah’s Witnesses raised religious 
objections to reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. In Gobitis, the Court 
                                                     
137. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
138. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1962); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 
421 (1961). 
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voted eight to one to uphold the expulsion of Witness children from their 
Pennsylvania public school for their refusal to recite the Pledge.139 The 
Court acknowledged that reasonable people might disagree on whether 
mandatory recitation of the Pledge is a good idea, but asserted that “the 
courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy.”140 
Although it professed not to take sides in curricular matters, the majority 
opinion in fact endorsed a very specific vision of the educational 
mission, in which the highest purpose of public school is to instill an 
ethic of patriotic conformity.141 The majority observed that the time 
children spend in school constitutes “the formative period in the 
development of citizenship,” and that the school’s goal is to prepare 
youth to become citizens of a democratic society.142 The majority also 
believed that “[t]he ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding 
tie of cohesive sentiment,”143 and that without a “unifying 
sentiment . . . there can ultimately be no liberties.”144 Hence, freedom 
requires a population that has been thoroughly schooled in conformity. 
Having identified inculcation of “cohesive sentiment” as the purpose 
of a school, it was simple enough for the Court to conclude that 
mandatory recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance was acceptable, even 
preferred. The Pledge is simply one of “those compulsions which 
necessarily pervade so much of the educational process.”145 Allowing 
exceptions for religious or conscientious objectors “might introduce 
elements of difficulty into the school discipline, [and] might cast doubts 
in the minds of the other children which would themselves weaken the 
effect of the exercise.”146 In the majority’s view, instilling unified 
sentiments was so crucial that anything that might “cast doubts” about 
the validity of those sentiments should be expunged. 
Gobitis drew national attention to the nonconformity of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, and pressures mounted to make them conform. Assaults, 
kidnappings, lynchings, and even torture of Witnesses occurred in 
                                                     
139. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591–92, 600 (1940). For more information, 
see Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 
433 (Michael C. Dorf. ed., 2004). 
140. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 596. 
144. Id. at 597. 
145. Id. at 598. 
146. Id. at 600. 
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several states.147 In one instance, a perpetrator reportedly told police that 
Witnesses were being run out of town because “[t]hey’re traitors—the 
Supreme Court says so. Ain’t you heard?”148 Some states enacted 
statutes requiring a flag salute in all public schools, even if the matter 
had previously been left to local control. Among these states was West 
Virginia, whose 1941 statute was to be enforced by expelling objecting 
students from school, declaring them delinquent, and jailing their 
parents.149 
Although much popular sentiment favored mandatory flag salutes in 
public schools, sizable portions of public opinion (and particularly elite 
opinion) had turned against them. Gobitis had not been well received by 
scholarly legal commentators.150 The persecution of Witnesses—
unmentioned in Barnette—surely left a sour taste in the mouths of some 
justices, and in Jones v. City of Opelika,151 another case involving the 
speech rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses, three Justices stated that they now 
believed Gobitis had been wrongly decided.152 Emboldened by these 
developments, several state courts declined to follow Gobitis.153 
Furthermore, the nation’s entry into World War II prompted soul-
searching over the nature of American democracy as compared to the 
fascist states we were fighting overseas. In June 1942, Congress passed a 
statute recognizing a set of best practices for voluntary respect towards 
the flag, including the method for saluting the flag and reciting the 
Pledge.154 When Congress realized that the preferred method of salute 
bore an uncomfortable resemblance to the gestures of goose-stepping 
Nazis, Figure 2, Congress amended the law to its current form, where 
                                                     
147. Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 139, at 443–45. 
148. Id. at 445 & n.61 (quoting SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: 
RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 79 (2000)). 
149. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 & nn.5–8 (1943) (citing W. VA. 
CODE §§ 1847, 1851, 4904(4) (Supp. 1941)). 
150. See, e.g., id. at 635 n.15 (citing a series of disapproving articles from, among others, the law 
reviews of Fordham University, New York University, Washington University, and the University 
of Michigan). 
151. 316 U.S. 584 (1942). 
152. Id. at 624 (Black, J., dissenting). 
153. State court cases departing from Gobitis include Bolling v. Superior Court for Clallam 
County, 16 Wash. 2d 373, 379–82, 133 P.2d 803, 806–08 (1943) and State v. Smith, 127 P.2d 518, 
521–22 (Kan. 1942). 
154. Act of June 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-623, 56 Stat 377 (1942). “[T]he pledge of allegiance to 
the flag . . . [should] be rendered by standing with the right hand over the heart; extending the right 
hand, palm upward, toward the flag at the words ‘to the flag’ and holding this position until the end, 
when the hand drops to the side.” Id. § 7. 
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the hand remains over the heart.155 The stage was thus set for the 
Supreme Court’s six-to-three decision in West Virginia State Board of 




Figure 2 School children in Hawaii salute the flag, March 1941. 
 
Like Gobitis before it, the majority opinion in Barnette took efforts to 
express a vision for public education. The starting point was the same, 
namely that a school’s purpose is “educating the young for 
citizenship.”157 But Barnette rejected the notion that unthinking 
conformists made good citizens. To the contrary, a truly American 
educational system would cultivate “intellectual individualism” and 
“rich cultural diversities,” and these can thrive only where there is 
“freedom to differ.”158 Schools may not “strangle the free mind at its 
source” or “teach youth to discount important principles of our 
government [such as freedom of speech] as mere platitudes.”159 National 
                                                     
155. Act of Dec. 22, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-829, 56 Stat. 1074 (codified at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2006)). 
“[T]he pledge of allegiance to the flag . . . [should] be rendered by standing with the right hand over 
the heart.” Id. § 7. 
156. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
157. Id. at 637. 
158. Id. at 641–42. 
159. Id. at 637. 
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unity may be encouraged “by persuasion and example” but not 
commanded by force of law.160 Indeed, “history indicates a 
disappointing and disastrous end” for systems of “officially disciplined 
uniformity.”161 The Court was aware of the rigid educational system in 
Nazi Germany and saw no reason to emulate “the fast failing efforts of 
our present totalitarian enemies.”162 The danger to national security lay 
not in insufficient conformity: it lay in conformity itself. 
With Barnette expressing a vision of public education diametrically 
opposed to the one in Gobitis, it is no surprise that Barnette reached the 
opposite legal conclusion: schools are constitutionally required to allow 
dissenting students to opt out of the pledge.163 This remains the law 
today. 
As I have described in more detail elsewhere,164 school cases in the 
decades after Barnette followed a similar pattern in which a court’s 
beliefs about education drove its legal conclusions. The majority in 
Tinker rejected the notion that “foster[ing] a homogeneous people” was 
a legitimate purpose of a public school.165 Echoing Barnette, the 
majority stated that “[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not be 
enclaves of totalitarianism.”166 Instead, “[t]he Nation’s future depends 
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of 
ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than 
through any kind of authoritative selection.’”167 This view of the 
educational institution results in a (comparatively) speech-protective 
rule. 
By contrast, the majority in Bethel believed that preparation for 
citizenship required a school to “inculcate the habits and manners of 
civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as 
indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and 
the nation.”168 Thus, a school has an “interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”169 This interest may 
                                                     
160. Id. at 640. 
161. Id. at 637. 
162. Id. at 641. 
163. See id. at 642. 
164. Caplan, supra note 60. 
165. 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)). 
166. Id. at 511. 
167. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
168. 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE BEARDS’ 
NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (William Beard ed., rev. 1968) (1944)). 
169. Id. 
Caplan DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2010 2:31 PM 
2010] SPEECH IN SCHOOL AND PRISON 99 
 
properly express itself in punishment of a student who delivers a 
salacious speech at a school assembly. Morse involved a similarly 
constricted view of the purpose of a school. The majority never proposed 
what the purpose of a school might be, or what type of citizenship would 
result from a good public education. The Court said only that schools 
should “protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug 
abuse,”170 and “safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that 
can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”171 Where 
these are the only stated goals for a school, a rule against pro-drug 
speech is inevitable. 
B. Prisons 
It is tempting to describe a macro-level rhythm in the Supreme 
Court’s prison speech cases resembling the dramatic pendulum swing of 
the school speech cases (from Gobitis, to Barnette and Tinker, and then 
back to Bethel, Hazelwood, and Morse). This prison speech narrative 
would begin before the rights revolution, when courts adopted a “hands-
off” attitude to prisoner litigation,172 with some courts explicitly viewing 
prisoners as “slave[s] of the State” without claim to individual rights.173 
Procunier v. Martinez repudiated this extreme view, making it the 
Tinker of prison speech cases. The liberalizing vision of Procunier, 
however, was expressly reversed by Turner and its reasonableness 
standard. While valid in its general outlines, this prison speech narrative 
creates an illusion of greater change than actually occurred. It ignores 
that Procunier did not push the pendulum very far in the direction of 
free speech for prisoners within the institution, and as a result, Turner 
did not have very far to push back. 
The issue in Procunier was a prison’s ability to censor mail sent by 
prisoners to persons outside the institution. The Supreme Court found 
“no occasion to consider the extent to which an individual’s right to free 
speech survives incarceration” because the case implicated the speech 
rights of free persons outside the prison.174 “Whatever the status of a 
prisoner’s claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is 
                                                     
170. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007). 
171. Id. at 397. 
172. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228 (2001) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 
404 (1974)). 
173. Id. (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 139 (1977) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting)). 
174. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 408. 
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plain that the latter’s interest is grounded in the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of freedom of speech.”175 To uphold the rights of non-
prisoners, Procunier invalidated prison rules that would censor letters to 
outsiders that “unduly complain[ed]” or criticized prison staff,176 and 
required the creation of procedures to challenge mail censorship.177 Later 
cases disavowed some of the precise language used in Procunier 
(primarily regarding a prison’s need to show that its mail censorship is 
“no greater than is necessary or essential” to serve “important” 
government interests178) as a standard by which to judge speech within a 
prison, but Procunier’s actual holdings regarding outside 
communications remain good law.179 For prisoners’ speech within the 
institution that does not implicate the speech rights of non-incarcerated 
persons, the Court has never supplied more protection than found in 
Turner. 
If the changing constitutional rules for student speech flow from 
changes in judicial perceptions of school as an institution (as seen in the 
comparison of Gobitis and Barnette), does the prevailing stasis in 
constitutional rules for prisoner speech reflect a similar lack of 
movement in judicial perceptions of prisons as institutions? This seems 
to be the case. There is remarkable consensus as to the purposes of a 
prison. Its functions are retribution, incapacitation (keeping the prisoner 
off the streets for the duration of the sentence),180 deterrence (dissuading 
the prisoner and others from committing crimes in the future), and 
rehabilitation (improving the prisoner).181 These interests are routinely 
recited together. There is no pendulum here, only a constellation of fixed 
stars. 
One could imagine a scenario where the relative weight of these 
penological interests might vary over time, perhaps with rehabilitation 
taking on a greater role in some historical periods than others. Although 
conceivable, this movement is not reflected in Supreme Court opinions. 
Consistently over time, rehabilitation is of secondary importance. Many 
opinions do not mention rehabilitation at all when listing the purposes of 
incarceration. For example, the portion of Turner that struck down a 
                                                     
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 415–16. 
177. Id. at 417–19. 
178. Id. at 413–14. 
179. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 410–12 (1989). 
180. E.g., Procunier, 416 U.S. at 426 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Prison walls serve not merely to 
restrain offenders but also to isolate them.”). 
181. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 562–63 (1974). 
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prison regulation forbidding prisoners from getting married made no 
mention of any potential rehabilitative purpose that marriage might 
serve.182 And when rehabilitative interests are acknowledged, they will 
be trumped by any legitimate assertion of the security considerations that 
are necessary for punishment and incapacitation.183 Indeed, if an opinion 
by a Supreme Court Justice elevates rehabilitation to a decisive place, 
the chances are good that it is a dissent.184 
With such a solid judicial consensus behind the purposes of a prison, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the constitutional speech rules for 
prisoners have not changed much either. However, a different 
comparison—between prisons and jails—sheds light on the judiciary’s 
understanding of penal institutions. 
C. Schools as Jails 
Prisons house convicted felons serving their sentences. Jails house 
detainees being held for trial (along with some convicted misdemeanants 
serving short sentences). The leading case on the rights of detainees is 
Bell v. Wolfish,185 which explained that because pretrial detainees are 
innocent until proven guilty, they have a “right to be free from 
punishment”186 even though they are not free from physical restraint in 
the form of incarceration.187 The state may take measures necessary to 
ensure detainees’ appearance at trial and may also enforce measures 
necessary for the security and safety of the facility.188 But detainees are, 
at least in theory, to be treated better than convicted felons when it 
comes to punitive regulations. 
The distinction between prison and jail is clearest in Fourth 
Amendment cases challenging searches or seizures within the institution. 
DNA may be routinely collected from some categories of convicted 
                                                     
182. 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987). 
183. E.g., Procunier, 416 U.S. at 412–13 (“While the weight of professional opinion seems to be 
that inmate freedom to correspond with outsiders advances rather than retards the goal of 
rehabilitation, the legitimate governmental interest in the order and security of penal institutions 
justifies the imposition of certain restraints on inmate correspondence.”). 
184. E.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 548 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Meachum v. Fano, 
423 U.S. 215, 234 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
185. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
186. Id. at 534. 
187. See id. at 535–40. 
188. Id. at 540; see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589–91 (1984) (upholding 
suspicionless searches of jail cells similar to those conducted on prison cells). 
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felons,189 but not from pretrial detainees.190 Strip searches and even 
body-cavity searches in prisons are generally allowed without 
individualized suspicion,191 but in jails such searches may only be 
performed upon a showing of individualized suspicion that the detainee 
is concealing contraband.192 
Occasionally, one sees a judicial opinion in a speech case that reveals 
a similar sensitivity to the different institutional functions of prisons and 
jails. Mauro v. Arpaio193 involved a rule at the Maricopa County Jail in 
Phoenix, Arizona banning delivery of any magazines containing 
nudity.194 Judge Fletcher’s opinion for the panel concluded that the rule 
was overbroad (reaching even medical photographs or artistic nudes that 
one might find in an art history magazine), and hence not reasonably 
related to a legitimate pedagogical concern under Turner.195 An en banc 
panel reversed, drawing a dissent from Judge Kleinfeld, which Judge 
Fletcher joined in part.196 This dissent pointed out that the inmates in this 
case were pretrial detainees in a jail and not convicted felons in a 
prison.197 There was substantial evidence in the record that the anti-
nudity rule was imposed for the punitive purpose of making detention 
more onerous.198 If that motive proved to be true, the speech restriction 
would be an improper punitive measure for a jail, even if it might be 
allowed within a prison.199 
The dissent from the en banc opinion in Mauro reveals how 
sensitivity to institutional purposes should affect the applicable legal 
rules. It also raises a disquieting question: perhaps school speech fares 
better than prison speech only insofar as schools resemble jails. Like a 
jail, a school holds a population that is, if not quite imprisoned, not quite 
free either. 
 
                                                     
189. E.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995) (Fletcher, J.). 
190. E.g., Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2009). 
191. E.g., Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332–33 (9th Cir. 1988) (Fletcher, J.). 
192. Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2008); Kennedy v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 
702, 713–14 (9th Cir. 1989). But see Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008). 
193. 147 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J.), rev’d en banc, 188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). 
194. Id. at 1138. 
195. Id. at 1140–41. 
196. Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1063; accord Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147, 1155–56 (10th 
Cir. 2007) (upholding a jail’s ban on sexually explicit publications). 
197. Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1067–70 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
198. Id. at 1067. 
199. See id. at 1067–70. 
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This potential link between jails and schools becomes clearer if we 
consider how the Fourth Amendment applies in public schools. Just as 
Tinker held that First Amendment free speech rights exist in school (but 
in modified form), New Jersey v. T.L.O.200 held that Fourth Amendment 
search-and-seizure rights also exist in school (but again in modified 
form).201 Searches by school officials are not subject to the warrant 
requirement,202 and in the case of drug tests for student athletes, searches 
may be performed without individualized suspicion if justified by 
“special needs.”203 
The Supreme Court recently held in Safford Unified School District v. 
Redding204 that a school violated the Fourth Amendment when it strip 
searched a junior high school girl to see if she was hiding ibuprofen 
tablets.205 Strip searches are not per se violations of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court said, but they require individualized suspicion 
and must be limited in scope.206 The majority did not analogize directly 
to the rules for strip searches in jails, but the end result is similar. 
(Justice Thomas’s opinion unapologetically compared the strip search in 
Redding to that in Bell v. Wolfish.)207 
When Vernonia School District v. Acton208 approved a random drug 
testing policy for student athletes, the dissent objected (in an argument 
reminiscent of the dissent in Ingraham v. Wright) that the majority was 
treating students worse than prisoners.209 The dissent cited Bell v. 
Wolfish, the leading jail case, to the effect that individual suspicion was 
required for searches even amongst incarcerated persons.210 In an 
inadvertently revealing footnote, Justice Scalia responded for the 
majority that the dissenters had it all wrong: 
 There is no basis for the dissent’s insinuation that in upholding 
the District’s Policy we are equating the Fourth Amendment 
                                                     
200. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
201. Id. at 333, 336–37. 
202. Id. at 340. 
203. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868, 873 (1987)); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). 
204. 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
205. Id. at 2637–38. 
206. Id. at 2639, 2643. 
207. Id. at 2649 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
Justice Thomas also equates school and prison cases. Id. at 2652 n.4 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 
536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002) (school search); Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 536–37 (prison speech)). 
208. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
209. Id. at 681 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
210. Id. 
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status of schoolchildren and prisoners, who, the dissent asserts, 
may have what it calls the “categorical protection” of a “strong 
preference for an individualized suspicion requirement.” The 
case on which it relies for that proposition, Bell v. Wolfish, 
displays no stronger a preference for individualized suspicion 
than we do today.211 
What a relief. The Fourth Amendment does not treat students worse 
than it treats pretrial detainees. It treats them exactly the same as it treats 
pretrial detainees. 
CONCLUSION 
As my tone of rueful irony may suggest, I agree with the premise of 
Andy Singer’s cartoon that too much similarity between educational 
institutions and penal institutions is a bad thing. The shorthand term 
“school-to-prison pipeline” describes a set of policies that, in many 
communities, are turning schools into adjuncts of the criminal justice 
system.212 These include police in schools, formalized information-
sharing between schools and police, and referrals of routine discipline 
problems to prosecutors for charging as crimes. A judicial discourse that 
analogizes schools to jails cannot help but strengthen the logic that 
supports the school-to-prison pipeline. The analogy suggests that 
schools, like jails, are warehouses for a suspect population not entitled to 
the full rights of citizenship. And we cannot claim surprise or alarm if 
some individuals remain under institutionalized government control in 
some other, harsher, form after doing their time in the present institution. 
Courts do not create most of our society’s institutions. But just as 
judges’ perceptions about various societal institutions influence court 
opinions, the words of those opinions may affect social perceptions 
about institutions. The use of Gobitis to justify persecution of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses (“They’re traitors—the Supreme Court says so”) is a dramatic 
example. The process is ordinarily slower and more subtle. When 
Vernonia upheld drug testing for student athletes, the Court described 
the program as something “a reasonable guardian and tutor might 
                                                     
211. Id. at 664 n.3 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
212. See, e.g., Tona M. Boyd, Comment, Confronting Racial Disparity: Legislative Responses to 
the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571 (2009); TEXAS APPLESEED, TEXAS’ 
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: DROPOUT TO INCARCERATION (2007), available at 
http://www.texasappleseed.net/pdf/Pipeline%20Report.pdf; THE ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO 
TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE POLICIES (2000), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/ 
research/discipline/opport_suspended.php. 
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undertake.”213 My reaction at the time was that no reasonable guardian 
or tutor would ever require children to take suspicionless home drug 
tests as a condition of playing school sports. Twenty years later, radio 
stations near me play an advertisement for a drug testing company in 
which a mother speaks nervously to her teenage son. “Kevin,” she says, 
“I’ve heard they might start drug testing in your school, so I need to ask 
you some questions. Have you ever done pot? Cocaine? Prescription 
drugs?”214 The declaration from the Supreme Court that reasonable 
guardians and tutors require home drug tests may be fulfilling its own 
prophecy. This experience suggests that even casual judicial reliance on 
analogies between school speech and prison speech may have dangerous 
consequences. 
 
                                                     
213. 515 U.S. at 665. 
214. As the mother continues questioning her son, an announcer cuts in to say: “Now there’s a 
way to get the whole truth at home, and keep it there.” FIRST CHECK HOME DRUG TEST, 
http://psynchronous.com/clients/firstcheck/savvy.mp3 (last visited October 18, 2009). 
